Nissan and Shiseido's Reformer: Lessons from the ‘Professional Manager’ for Young Leaders — Insights from Mitsuru Kameyama

He worked on global projects at Nissan Motor Company ('Nissan') during the transformative period under Carlos Ghosn. Alongside Masahiko Uotani, a renowned professional manager, he helped transform Shiseido into a globally competitive company known for its quick decision-making. He also spearheaded digital transformation (DX) at Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, a major manufacturing firm with a long history, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Mitsuru Kameyama, a Senior Executive Advisor at Gloving and President of Conepositive, has played a key role in supporting critical reforms at leading Japanese companies from an IT perspective.

In promoting reform, Kameyama places importance on "clearly stating the ideal image of the company or organization and the value axis that needs to be changed in order to realize it," "being prepared to seriously carry through with determination," "involving colleagues to fight as one," and "supporting the challenge and not blaming failure. What project experiences did Mr. Kameyama encounter, and what lessons did he learn from professional managers that made him value these principles?.

A spectacular project experience that formed the core of a reformer

─ In your interview with Kameyama, the words "determination" and "seriousness" often appear. What kind of project was the first time you experienced the "determination"?

The first project that tested my resolve was a telematics car project during my time at Nissan. Today, it is commonplace to link cars and IT, but when I was assigned to this project more than 20 years ago, the field was still in its infancy, and it was difficult to even imagine what the service would be like. It was at that time that I was assigned a project to link cars and IT. At the time, the automotive industry was at the dawn of a new era, and various alliances were emerging. One such project was led by General Motors (GM) of the United States. The company had launched an in-vehicle telematics service called OnStar, and Toyota was to participate in the project.

At the same time, Ford, a major U.S. automotive company, announced that it would launch a similar service, and Nissan was to work with the Ford camp to promote the use of IT in cars. I was appointed to lead this global project. The project was to equip cars with devices to receive and display communications, and to communicate with a communications center developed by Ford, so that information useful for driving and information about the city could be obtained inside the car. The project was led by Ford and involved various automobile companies, including Renault and Nissan.

Among them, Nissan was developing the car with the goal of becoming the world's first company to implement the service. Working together with the research, development, and sales teams, and with the desire to "make the world more interesting with a new service that does not yet exist," we overcame many hardships and finally managed to launch a telematics-enabled car in the United States in August of 2002.

However, in 2002, Ford's management deteriorated, the top management was replaced, and the company announced a policy to focus on its core business. I had a bad feeling about this, and in June Ford decided to liquidate its telematics service company. Nissan's telematics cars had been developed on the premise of Ford's system, and if this situation continued, the in-vehicle equipment we had worked so hard to develop would become useless. When I explained the situation to Carlos Ghosn, who was COO at the time, he said, "Do something. I told him, "Go talk to GM and ask them to let us use their services. Go talk to him today," he said recklessly (laughs).

(Laughs.) "There is no way we can bow down to a company that was our rival and have them respond immediately. I thought to myself, "This is a bad situation," but I knew that if I didn't do something, my investment of tens of billions of yen would go down the drain, and above all, the equipment that I had worked so hard to develop with my colleagues would be wasted. At that time, I was really cornered and in a situation where I had no choice. However, it was thanks to my fellow project members that I was able to avoid being crushed by a sense of doom and gloom. There was no way I could change this situation by myself. No matter how much energy I put into it, I couldn't make a proposal by myself. Then I had no choice but to involve the people around me.

I thought, "I have no choice but to involve the development team, the research institute, people in the sales department, outside experts, and people from partner companies (......) and work together with them. I know we are in an untenably difficult situation, but we have to do whatever we can. But we have to do whatever we can. From then on, the whole team worked together to come up with a solution, and I spent many days fighting my way from one negotiation to the next, flying from one plane to another.

However, despite our determination and continued negotiations, we were ultimately unsuccessful, and the project with the global giant was terminated. The project thus ended in failure, but I believe I learned a number of things from this experience that will guide me later as a professional. One is to "not blame the failure of a challenge, but learn from it.

In fact, when this project was over, the vice president from Renault, who was my boss at the time, said to me, "We have to stop here. We must not stop here. We must not stop here, because in the future, cars will be equipped with IT, and what we did was not a mistake. We have gained a lot of knowledge and our team members are still here. We will find other partners and move forward with this initiative." Although the outside world sometimes blamed us for the failure of the project, my direct supervisor understood the true nature of the project. He then said, "Let's do our best for the future of Nissan.

Nowadays, we often hear the phrases "it is important to learn from failures" and "challenges are important" in the context of DX, but it is often not always the case that this is built into the company's mechanisms. But the Vice President of Nissan at the time was different. Without his words, I might not have recovered from my failure.

This incident made me resolve to become a leader who does not blame his subordinates for their failures, but rather says, "Let's learn from them together. I also believe that this incident symbolized the beginning of a change in Nissan's culture as a result of the capital tie-up with Renault. The other thing is the importance of being determined and working through a project with passion and earnestness. I felt a great sense of accomplishment when I was able to complete negotiations on a difficult phase of a global project with my title as section manager, and even though the project ended in failure, I accumulated a great deal of experience and a great sense of accomplishment. After this project, I became able to face even difficult projects without fear.

Even if I think a project is difficult, if I want to do it, I declare at that moment, "I will do it! and declare, "I'll do it! Then I make up my mind and get others involved. Not everyone will cooperate from the start, but I have learned through my experience with many projects how to explain things to people and get them interested. If you are not prepared and committed, it will be challenging to engage others in tough situations. I think it is important to clearly show the way forward, and to proceed with the project with determination and passion. I think this project helped me to formulate what I value in my work: not to blame others for my failures, but to learn and grow from them.

─ Did witnessing the moment when a company's culture changed so drastically change the way you think about your work afterwards?

I think so. Before the capital tie-up with Renault, Nissan Motors had a so-called hierarchical organizational structure, which is typical of Japanese companies with a long history. For example, when I, as a section manager at the time, wanted to propose something, I first asked the general manager, then the director in charge, and even if the proposal was approved and I could propose it to the management committee, I had to meet and negotiate with the directors beforehand. Even if the proposal was approved and presented to the management committee, the decision-making process took a long time because it required an intricate process of meeting and negotiating with the directors.

This process took a long time for decision-making. This changed completely once I took over the management of Renault. In a word, decision-making became logical and speedy. If it is clear what the project is for, what the benefits will be, and what needs to be done to realize it, then it is natural that the person who understands the project best, whether it is the section manager or someone else, should make the proposal.

The management team was consistent in its approach: if the proposal was logical and promised to contribute to the company’s growth, they were willing to listen. Nissan's organizational culture changed dramatically during this period, and the speed of decision-making increased dramatically. I was truly amazed at the speedy decision-making process that changed from the long time it took to submit proposals to Ghosn, to the instantaneous e-mail to Ghosn upon electronic drafting, and the decision on "matters that Ghosn decides to take on" being made in one minute. As you all know, these reforms led to the V-shaped reform of Nissan at that time.

What I learned from a reforming manager

─ Kameyama, you have been promoting reforms together with professional managers who are known as reformers in the business world. What did you learn from them?

I was often surprised by the work of Ghosn, who came from Renault and became COO of Nissan. Looking back on it now, he was a logical person through and through. First of all, he was never a minute late for a meeting, always arriving at his seat 30 seconds before the meeting. He always calculated how much time he would waste if he was one minute late for a meeting, and how much it would cost the company.

For example, if a meeting is attended by 20 department heads, if I calculate the labor cost and the number of participants, I figure that if I make them wait for one minute, it will result in a loss of more than 100,000 yen. As far as I know, Ghosn was late for a meeting only once, and that was because the clock in the previous conference room was running late, and when he walked into the room two minutes late, the first thing he did was to bow and apologize for wasting everyone's time.

The meeting itself was very lean. At the beginning, you make sure "what is the place to decide today's meeting?" and by the end of the meeting, you are absolutely sure of what to decide. If it was not clear what needed to be decided, I would point it out, and if I did not have all the materials to make a decision, I would say, "We will decide tomorrow, so come back with all the materials you have. This way of conducting meetings has become the norm over the past 10 years or so, but I remember being very surprised because I had never seen a meeting that proceeded in such a logical manner at that time.

No matter what Ghosn did, he always thought through "what is the purpose of doing it," "for whom is it done," and "what value does it create? As I was exposed to this way of thinking, I began to think, "It doesn't matter whether I am a section manager or a general manager, I have to clarify the resources and tasks for what needs to be done and get it done.

─ While you were at Shiseido, you worked with Masahiko Uotani, a professional manager who has been involved in numerous corporate reforms. What kind of influence did he have on you?

I learned a lot from Uotani's reform methods. Uotani became president of Shiseido, a long-established cosmetics manufacturer founded in 1872, with the mission of "making Shiseido a company that can grow globally" and "making Shiseido a company that will last for the next 100 years. This task requires top management to change what needs to be altered while preserving the company's core values.

In conclusion, in the four to five years since Uotani became president, the company has gone paperless, English has become the official language, and a culture of not being afraid to take on new challenges, learning from mistakes, and taking on new challenges has become widespread. I think this is largely due to the fact that Uotani clearly presented the "ideal image of Shiseido in the future" to employees, always carefully explaining "what needs to be protected and what needs to be changed to realize it," and practicing this himself.

Before Uotani's arrival, Shiseido had a culture of taking on challenges, but projects were carried out steadily and carefully, with consensus among the people involved to avoid failure as much as possible. Of course, it is good to prepare and proceed carefully, but it inevitably lacked a sense of speed. In contrast, Uotani, immediately after assuming the position of CEO, formulated a policy of "First, let's try it, and then let's move on immediately. Immediately after assuming the position of CEO, he said, "From today, we don't need paper documents for management meetings. He also clearly stated the management style he wanted to implement, saying, "I don't want to use 'sir' in internal e-mails, but 'san' instead, He started working to change the organization into one that is flat and capable of speedy decision making.

In 2014, the slogan "Move, Shiseido! In 2014, Shiseido announced its medium- to long-term strategy "VISION 2020" under the slogan "Move, Shiseido. Don't be afraid of failure. The important thing is to try, fail, and try again.

What is amazing about Uotani is that he not only acts in this spirit, but also pushes his leaders and working-level staff to take on more and more challenges. We will not be able to achieve our goals if we continue with our current approach. In order to achieve "globalization of Shiseido," which is the key to achieving the goal, and "a corporate culture in which each individual works autonomously," we will change the culture that needs to be changed, and try to reach the goal at any cost, including "People First" initiatives to raise the potential of each employee and thoroughly bring out his/her own potential. We are trying to reach our goal at all costs. The level of commitment to accomplish this is extraordinary, and they never give up.

If something goes wrong with a measure, they immediately report it to us, we sort out the problem together, and as soon as we think we can solve it with a different logic, we gather the people involved for a thorough discussion and decide on a solution within a time frame of today or tomorrow, In any case, we move thoroughly and make decisions quickly. I was overwhelmed by Uotani's ambition to clearly show why Shiseido must change with facts and real voices, to push employees to accept the new culture, and to complete the globalization of Shiseido at any cost.

What Ghosn and Uotani have in common is their clear approach to communicating the need for a company to shift its value axis when necessary. To ensure continuous growth, a company may need to alter its organizational structure or business model. During such times, the "axis of values important for work" also undergoes significant changes. Both leaders share the ability to clearly explain this shift by comparing the company’s ideal state with its current situation, encouraging employees, embedding the change throughout the organization, and establishing a new culture. This top-down process of guiding and instilling change is a shared trait of both leaders and is essential for a transformative leader.

What is important to change a company with a long history

─ Nissan and Shiseido were reforms in the form of top management from outside the company who came in from the outside and changed the company with strong leadership. I heard that Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, where you promoted DX (Digital Transformation) as CDO, was a different type of reform.

That is right. Nissan and Shiseido were reforms in the style of "change by external pressure," while Mitsubishi Materials was a style of "change from within" with a board of directors that was mostly made up of professionals. In that sense, it was indeed a different and more difficult task than in the past.

─ What difficulties did you encounter in the course of the DX project that were different from those you faced in the past?

In some respects, it is more difficult to instill a new culture while leaving the top management and executive structure intact than it is to effect change from the top down by a president who comes from outside the company. Mitsubishi Materials is a company with a long history, founded in 1871, but it was promoting corporate reforms in the wake of the quality problems uncovered in 2017; DX was one of them, and I joined Mitsubishi Materials in February 2020 as the general manager of this project entitled "MMDX," and in April 2020, the DX I launched the DX Promotion Division in April 2020.

This project was a major undertaking, involving an investment of more than 40 billion yen over six years, with themes to be addressed from the perspectives of "strengthening customer contact points," "process collaboration," and "speeding up management. The policy was to change what needed to be changed for future growth while preserving the core values that Mitsubishi Materials had developed over its long history. However, the Corona disaster occurred while we were in the process of proposing this project. The main customers of the product-based business division, which was the main source of earnings, were in the automobile and airline industries, both of which had been severely affected by Corona.

We were just in the process of finalizing our proposal for MMDX, and gradually the atmosphere within the company began to change: "If things continue as they are, we will have a difficult financial year, so we need to cut our budget thoroughly starting in July and stop what we can stop. Since this is a company with a long history, they are very cautious there. On the other hand, our DX team was explaining the promotion of DX at the management meeting every week, but there were whispers of "If we haven't started yet, maybe we should stop" and "We don't have to spend 40 billion yen to do it.

DX is an initiative that could even negate the corporate culture of the past, so unless the management and leadership are of the same mind and are prepared to seriously promote it, it will not be possible to change. Moreover, if the project fails, the investment will be wasted. I can understand why people are cautious in the face of an emergency situation like Corona, but that is precisely why we must now create a strong organization that can continue to grow even if something similar happens next time. It is truly "time to change our value axis," and that cannot happen without the cooperation of our board members. How can we make DX a personal matter for all concerned? What Ghosn and Uotani had done from the top down, now I was to do it as CDO, wasn't I?

This is a reform that only I, who know all about the benefits of DX change for Japanese companies with a long history, can make, so I have no choice but to carry it through. I want people to know how much growth can be achieved by transforming a leading company that excels in manufacturing into a flat and speedy organization. The hurdles were high, but I was determined to tackle them. What we did to get the executives to understand why MMC needed DX was to hold almost weekly discussions at executive board meetings and executive camps. The strategy was to deepen their understanding and have them make DX their own business through frank discussions and unanimous agreement.

On the day of the camp, we used the scenario as a basis for explaining the initiatives of competitors and having executives from other companies talk about DX, saying, "Even our company is doing this much. --The process was carried out in the following way. I was pleased that by the evening of the day, all the participating executives had agreed to "promote DX. I felt that we were able to clearly demonstrate what role MMDX would play in the future that MMC was aiming for. At last, we had reached the starting point of the DX.

What I want to convey to future leaders

─ It is said that reform in Japanese companies is slow to take place. What do you think is the reason for this, Kameyama? What do you think is essential for Japanese companies to reform?

I believe that the key to reform is the "value axis" and "human resources. Management must clearly define the value axis by stating, 'This is how we will change the company' and 'This is how we will implement a new way of working. I think it is also important to increase the number of leaders who are prepared and able to carry through with the implementation of these ideas.

Many Japanese companies still have hierarchical organizations, but if the color of the hierarchy becomes too strong, subordinates will not be able to fully demonstrate their abilities. This is a great loss for the company. I think it is important for a leader who promotes reform not only to give instructions and make people follow them, but also to draw out the willingness of subordinates to "try something like this" or "try something like this," and how to match this with the vision that the company is aiming for.

If we can draw out the intrinsic motivation of subordinates in this way, the number of employees who think and act on their own will increase, and the organization will become more energetic, which in turn should lead to the revitalization of the company.

They must understand the company's vision, think through how their own department can contribute to it, communicate this to their team members in easy-to-understand terms, and work together as a team to move forward, while incorporating feedback. Such leaders are needed today. If top management can firmly define the "ideal image" and the "value axis" for realizing it, the company will surely change in the direction it is aiming for.

I believe that Japanese companies can grow even more. I would like to see young leaders seriously transform not only the potential of the company, but also the potential of its people into something positive.

Written by Sachiko Goto Photographed by Kaori Nishida